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Recent Decisions
PROPERTY-ZONING-EXCLUSIONARY ZONING--The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has refused to extend the decision in Appeal of
Girsh to hold unconstitutional a zoning ordinance which fails to
provide for townhouse development, thus limiting the ability of
low and moderate income individuals to own their own homes.
In re Appeal of M.A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075
(1983).
On May 7, 1975 the appellee, M.A. Kravitz Company, went
before the zoning board of Wrightstown Township seeking ap-
proval of a townhouse development.' Contending that the control-
ling zoning ordinance was unconstitutional in its failure to provide
for townhouse development, Kravitz petitioned for a curative
amendment.2 Kravitz also argued that even if the development of
townhouses was not absolutely prohibited, it was provided for in
such a limited area that it amounted to an unconstitutional de
facto exclusion.3
The zoning board ruled that Wrightstown's ordinance did permit
townhouse development, and thus denied the curative amend-
ment.4 The board also determined that the township provided am-
1. In re Appeal of M.A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa. 200, 203, 460 A.2d 1075, 1077 (1983).
2. Id. For a detailed discussion of the curative amendment process, see Rosenzweig,
The Curative Amendment Procedure in Pennsylvania: The Landowner's Challenge to the
Substantive Validity of Zoning Restrictions, 80 DICK. L. REV. 43 (1975).
3. 501 Pa. at 203, 460 A.2d at 1077.
4. Id. at 203-04, 460 A.2d at 1077. The relevant definitional sections of the zoning
ordinance, article 100, section 102.3 read as follows:
Single Family Attached Dwellings (Townhouse)
A building designed for and occupied exclusively as a residence for one family and
having a party wall on at least one side (on both sides) in common with an adjacent
building.
Single Family Detached Dwelling
A building designed for and occupied exclusively as a residence for only one family
and having no party wall in common with an adjacent building.
Multi-Family Dwelling
A building designed for or occupied by three or more families.
Id. The ordinance also creates four residential districts. Districts R-1 andR-2 allow only
single-family detached houses, R-3 allows, in addition, agricultural uses, and R-4 allows
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ple area for its anticipated population growth and that the ordi-
nance did not amount to a de facto exclusion. This decision was
affirmed by the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County.5 The
commonwealth court then reversed, directing approval of Kravitz'
proposed development." In a 4-3 decision 7 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court reversed, reinstating the order of the common pleas
court.8
Justice Zappala, writing for the court, noted that the common-
wealth court decision was an extension of a line of rulings which
considered zoning prohibitions on townhouse development. 9 In
these cases, according to Justice Zappala, the commonwealth court
found that ordinances that prohibit or fail to reasonably provide
for townhouse construction are unconstitutional. Applying this
principle in Kravitz, the commonwealth court concluded that the
ordinance was unconstitutional because it "fail[ed] to provide a
home for [the] legitimate and necessary development [of
townhouses].' '10
Justice Zappala noted that the commonwealth court had relied
on a 1970 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, Appeal of Girsh,"
in its holdings that ordinances which restricted townhouse devel-
opment are unconstitutional.1 2 He maintained that the instant case
was distinguishable from Girsh, noting that the holding in that
multi-family dwellings that comprise a single operating unit. The board ruled that town-
houses may be built in districts designated R-4. 501 Pa. at 203, 460 A.2d at 1077.
5. M.A. Kravitz Co. v. Wrightstown Township Bd. of Supervisors, 32 Bucks Co. L.
Rep. 143 (1978).
6. In re Appeal of M.A. Kravitz Co., 53 Pa. Commw. 622, 419 A.2d 227 (1980).
7. In re Appeal of M.A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983). Justice Zap-
pala authored the opinion and was joined by Justices Roberts and McDermott. Justice Fla-
herty concurred in the result. Justice Nix filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Larsen
joined. Justice Hutchinson filed a separate dissent.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 204-05, 460 A.2d at 1078. This series of cases includes the following: Appeal
of Olson, 19 Pa. Commw. 514, 338 A.2d 748 (1975) (zoning ordinance which made no provi-
sion for townhouses held unconstitutional); Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw.
404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975) (zoning ordinance which completely banned townhouses held inva-
lid); Camp Hill Development Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 13 Pa. Commw. 519, 319
A.2d 197 (1974) (ordinance which prohibited construction of townhouses anywhere in bor-
ough held unconstitutional).
10. 501 Pa. at 205, 460 A.2d at 1078. See 53 Pa. Commw. at 628, 419 A.2d at 230.
11. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). The developer in Girsh sought to build two
apartment buildings with 280 units each on a 17.5 acre tract. The township had 75% of the
area zoned for single-family dwellings; the remaining area was zoned for commercial and
industrial use. Two apartment buildings had been granted a variance. 501 Pa. at 205-06, 460
A.2d at 1078.
12. Id. at 205, 460 A.2d at 1078.
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case rested on the fact that the township's ordinance failed to pro-
vide for any housing other than single family dwellings.13
Reviewing the two cases that provided the rationale for the
Girsh decision, Justice Zappala first examined Exton Quarries,
Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment." In Exton Quarries, he ex-
plained, the court held that an ordinance which totally blocks the
entrance of a particular business to an entire community must be
closely examined to determine whether it is constitutionally
valid.'5 Justice Zappala then looked to the court's decision in Na-
tional Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Ad-
justment, 16 where the court held that a municipality's zoning ordi-
nance cannot be valid when it is specifically designed to prevent
the entrance of new residents.1
7
Applying these cases to Girsh, Justice Zappala reasoned that
since multi-family dwellings were excluded under the ordinance,
this was a virtual exclusion of population growth, invalid under
National Land.'8 Justice Zappala also found that the exclusion of
population growth was a result of the ordinance being an explicit
prohibition, a characteristic found to be constitutionally suspect in
Exton Quarries."
Justice Zappala asserted that the commonwealth court had mis-
takenly interpreted Girsh in later cases to render unconstitutional
any ordinance that failed to provide for a particular use. 0 The cor-
rect interpretation of Girsh, according to the court, is that the or-
dinance in question was unconstitutional because it placed an ex-
plicit restraint on population growth.2' The commonwealth court,
according to Justice Zappala, expanded this holding, assuming that
if a particular use is not provided for by a zoning ordinance then
the restriction must be unreasonable and the ordinance
unconstitutional.2 2
Justice Zappala then pointed out that in Surrick v. Zoning
13. Id. at 206, 460 A.2d at 1079.
14. 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967).
15. 501 Pa. at 207, 460 A.2d at 1079. See 425 Pa. at 59, 228 A.2d at 179.
16. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
17. 501 Pa. at 208, 460 A.2d at 1079. See 419 Pa. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612. See also
infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
18. 501 Pa. at 208, 460 A.2d at 1079.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 208, 460 A.2d at 1079-80.




Hearing Bd. of Upper Providence" the court developed a method
of analysis for reviewing zoning ordinances alleged to be exclusion-
ary. Under this method, it must first be determined whether the
area in question is one logical for population expansion and devel-
opment. The factors considered in this analysis are the area's dis-
tances to major cities and projected population growth figures. If
the area is found to be one likely to experience a population in-
crease, then the present level of development must be examined to
determine if the community is already highly developed. 4 The
final part of the analysis consists of determining whether multi-
family dwellings are totally or partially excluded. If the zoning ex-
clusion is partial, it is more difficult to decide that the ordinance is
invalid.2 5 A partial exclusion must be further examined to deter-
mine if the restraint placed on population growth and development
is unreasonable.2
Before applying the Surrick analysis to the Wrightstown ordi-
nance, Justice Zappala first considered whether townhouse devel-
opment was in fact permitted under the ordinance. He reviewed
the testimony of the drafters of the zoning ordinance, taken by the
zoning board, which supported the conclusion that townhouses
were permitted in the township's R-4 district.2 7 While the com-
monwealth court had held that the R-4 district could not reasona-
bly be considered as accommodating townhouse development, Jus-
tice Zappala asserted that the zoning board's decision was
supported by substantial evidence and thus should not have been
reversed. By reversing the board, Justice Zappala maintained, the
commonwealth court had exceeded its power of review.28
The court then applied the Surrick analysis to the facts of the
present case. The court first noted that Wrightstown Township has
no major employers and is ten miles from the nearest employment
23. 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977).
24. 501 Pa. at 209, 460 A.2d at 1080.
25. Id. at 210, 460 A.2d at 1081.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 212, 460 A.2d at 1081. The president of the company that prepared the
zoning ordinance testified that townhouses "could be considered as a permitted housing
type under the multi-family district." Id.
28. Id. at 212-13, 460 A.2d at 1082. In instances where common pleas courts take no
additional evidence, Justice Zappala noted, appellate courts must confine themselves to a
decision of whether the board abused its discretion or made an error of law. See National
Land v. Easttown Township, 419 Pa. at 523, 215 A.2d at 607 (1965). If the board's findings
are supported by substantial evidence the court may not disturb those findings. See 53 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 11010 (Purdon 1982). 501 Pa. at 211, 460 A.2d at 1081.
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centers.2 9 The court also found that some population growth could
be expected.30 The court concurred with the zoning board's deci-
sion that although some population growth was anticipated, the
township was not a likely place for rapid growth and
development.31
The court then proceeded to the final step of the analysis which
consisted of determining whether the area allocated for multi-fam-
ily housing by the ordinance was of a reasonable amount. The ap-
pellees had argued that Wrightstown possessed only a token
amount of space for multi-family dwellings.32 Given the limited
projected population growth in the area, however, the court con-
cluded that the zoning ordinance adequately provided for new
dwelling units."s The court also found support for its position from
the fact that the township lacked mass transportation, major
roads, and a sewer system adequate to support large population
increases."
The court acknowledged that the appellee had shown evidence
that the population of Wrightstown would be rapidly expanding
and that this expansion would have no adverse effect on the town-
ship's infrastructure. Stating that it did not want to function as a
"planning commission of last resort", the court chose to accept the
findings of the local zoning board, pointing out that such bodies
possess special knowledge of local conditions." The court con-
cluded that in the instant case the zoning board had given just
consideration to the housing needs of the community. 6 Accord-
29. 501 Pa. at 213, 460 A.2d at 1082. Wrightstown is approximately 37 miles from
Philadelphia and 18 miles from Trenton. Other nearby major employment centers are
Doylestown (10 miles), Lower Bucks County (12 miles) and Montgomery County (15 miles).
Id.
30. Id. The population is expected to grow from 2266 in 1970 to 3004 in 1980, 3820 in
1985, and 4900 in 1990. Id.
31. Id. at 214, 460 A.2d at 1082.
32. Id. at 214, 460 A.2d at 1083. Wrightstown had only 40 acres out of a total 6491
acres (0.6%) zoned for multi-family housing. Id.
33. Id. The Bucks County Housing Plan projected that from 1974 to 1985 the town-
ship would need 259 additional housing units of all types. The R-4 district would accommo-
date 320 additional units. Id.
34. Id. at 215-16, 460 A.2d at 1083. The court noted that while townships could not
exclude reasonable housing growth by failing to provide adequate services, those services
which were lacking were more commonly provided by county or state authorities. The town-
ship had actually developed plans for a sewer system, but this service would not reach the
appellee's land in the near future. Id.
35. Id. See Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Providence, 476 Pa. at 194, 382
A.2d at 111.
36. 501 Pa. at 216, 460 A.2d at 1083.
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ingly, the court reversed the commonwealth court's decision.3 7
Justices Nix and Hutchinson filed dissenting opinions. Justice
Nix voiced his support for the commonwealth court's analysis.38 He
expressed concern that by giving local zoning boards great leeway,
they can virtually exclude certain uses based on local whim.3 9
Justice Hutchinson examined the zoning ordinance and con-
cluded that townhouses were in fact excluded. By allowing only
multi-family dwellings, the township only provided low income
families with the opportunity to rent, effectively blocking any op-
portunity for them to become homeowners;' 0 accordingly, Justice
Hutchinson would have struck down the ordinance as
unconstitutional.4'
Justice Hutchinson then reviewed the township's R-4 classifica-
tion zone, the only area where townhouses were arguably permit-
ted. Noting that the R-4 zone permitted only multi-family dwell-
ings, he reasoned that townhouses could not possibly be permitted
there since townhouses were defined as single-family buildings.'
While the majority relied on expert testimony that the intention of
the drafters was to include townhouses, 3 Justice Hutchinson
pointed out that the plain meaning of the statute should prevail."
Justice Hutchinson then considered whether townhouses consti-
tute a use which may not be excluded. He reasoned that
townhouses fill a need for single-family housing for low income
families which detached dwellings do not.45 Following the line of
reasoning in the commonwealth court cases following Girsh,"4 Jus-
tice Hutchinson agreed that townhouses are a distinct legitimate
use which a municipality must permit.
7
Justice Hutchinson also disagreed with the majority's interpreta-
tion of the Girsh decision, pointing out that in a case relied on in
Girsh, Exton Quarries, it was held that an ordinance which totally
excludes a business from an area must exhibit a substantial rela-
37. Id.
38. Id. at 216, 460 A.2d at 1084 (Nix, J., dissenting). Justice Larsen joined in this
dissent.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 216-17, 460 A.2d at 1084. (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 217, 460 A.2d at 1084. (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. See supra note 27.
.44. 501 Pa. at 217-18, 460 A.2d at 1084 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). See 1 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 921(b)(1982).
45. 501 Pa. at 219, 460 A.2d at 1085 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
46. See supra note 9.
47. 501 Pa. at 220, 460 A.2d at 1085 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
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tionship to a community health or safety interest."' Justice Hutch-
inson then noted that the supreme court's ruling in Beaver Gas v.
Osborne Borough49 required that a municipality show some public
purpose to sustain a total ban over a legitimate use.50 In the pre-
sent case, Justice Hutchinson maintained that no evidence had
been produced to show a public purpose sufficient to justify the
exclusion of townhouses.5 1
Justice Hutchinson also contended that by not allowing a partic-
ular residential use, a community unreasonably interferes with
both the rights of property owners and the interests of people who
desire to live in newly developed areas. 2 He further stated that a
total exclusion cannot be justified by finding that the community is
not in the path of development under the Surrick "fair share"
analysis, asserting that the determination of which community is
in the path of development is unsuitable for judicial determina-
tion.53 Also, according to Justice Hutchinson, the fact that a devel-
oper wants to build townhouses in a community is a strong indica-
tion that there is a demand for such housing."Justice Hutchinson
agreed that some exclusions may be proper exercises of modern
land use planning. He did not, however, include in these excep-
tions effective exclusions of moderate and low income people.5
Justice Hutchinson then submitted that since the Surrick
test-whether the community is in the path of. development-is
unrelated to the health, safety, or general morals of the commu-
nity, the test is unconstitutional under the standards developed in
Exton Quarries and Girsh.5 ' Being unrelated to legitimate commu-
nity interests, exclusions which are permitted under the Surrick
test may well be unreasonable interferences with property rights
protected by article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
48. Id. at 220, 460 A.2d at 1086. (Hutchinson, J.,dissenting). Justice Hutchinson
quoted from a previous supreme court opinion which stated that "a zoning ordinance which
totally excludes a particular business from an entire municipality must bear a more substan-
tial relationship to the public health, safety, morals and general welfare than an ordinance
which merely confines that business to a certain area in the municipality." (citing Exton
Quarries, 425 Pa. 43 at 60, 228 A.2d 169 at 179). 501 Pa. at 220-21, 460 A.2d at 1086 (Hutch-
inson, J., dissenting).
49. 445 Pa. 571, 285 A.2d 501 (1971).
50. Id. at 577, 285 A.2d at 504-05.
51. 501 Pa. at 221, 460 A.2d at 1086 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Id.





and the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution, as well as the rights of newcom-
ers to seek affordable housing.
5
7
Concluding his dissent, Justice Hutchinson pointed out that the
Municipalities Planning Code summarizes the purpose of zoning,"s
and stated that he did not believe that Wrightstown Township's
exclusion of townhouses bore a substantial relationship to the pur-
pose of the code. 9
The United States Supreme Court first declared that zoning or-
dinances are a valid constitutional exercise of the police power in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty. ° The Court declared that a
zoning ordinance is presumed valid unless it is clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals and general welfare. Euclid's broad language,
however, provides little guidance for courts to determine if a par-
ticular ordinance is unconstitutional."' Since Euclid, the Supreme
Court has decided relatively few zoning cases, and has been very
reluctant to invalidate local zoning ordinances. e2 Pennsylvania and
other state courts, however, have been very active in deciding zon-
ing cases, particularly where local ordinances are challenged as be-
ing exclusionary. 3
Kravitz marks a retreat from the exclusionary zoning decisions
handed down by the state supreme and commonwealth courts in
the last twenty years. Since 1965, the Pennsylvania courts have
57. Id.
58. Id. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10105 (1982), which provides, in pertinent part, as
follows: "It is the intent, purpose and scope of this act to protect and promote safety, health
and morals; to accomplish coordinated development of municipalities... to provide for gen-
eral welfare. . . ." Id. at 222-23, 460 A.2d at 1087 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 223, 460 A.2d at 1087. (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
60. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Ambler Realty argued that the community's zoning of the
company's property for residential use decreased its value and amounted to a taking with-
out compensation in violation of the fifth amendment. Id. at 384-85.
61. See D. ALLENSWORTH, LAND PLANNING LAW 47 (1981).
62. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (low density zoning upheld as a
legitimate governmental goal to protect its citizens from the ill-effects of urbanization); Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
(racially discriminatory effect held not enough to declare ordinance unconstitutional; pur-
pose and effect must be shown); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S.
668 (1976) (vote by citizens against rezoning for apartments held to be valid). For criticism
of the Supreme Court's inactivity in exclusionary zoning, see Comment, Exclusionary Zon-
ing and a Reluctant Supreme Court, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107 (1977).
63. New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania courts have been the most active in in-
validating exclusionary ordinances. See Developments in the Law - Zoning, 91 HARv. L.
REv. 1427, 1635 & n.46 (1978).
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subjected local zoning ordinances to close scrutiny if they deter-
mine that an ordinance has the effect of "zoning out" population
growth." National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Town-
ship Bd. of Adjustment 5 marked the first time that the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court examined exclusionary zoning in depth. In
National Land the court struck down an ordinance which required
single-family dwellings to be built on lots of at least four acres.
The township had justified the restriction by arguing that the new
development would increase population and thereby overburden
the sewage system and increase the danger of water pollution. 66
The National Land court reasoned that the four acre minimum
ordinance was not a reasonable method to protect the township
from pollution. The court ruled that an ordinance, the main goal of
which is to prevent future burdens on the town's infrastructure by
blocking the entrance of newcomers, could not be upheld.67
The National Land decision was reaffirmed by the supreme
court in Concord Township Appeal.68 The court took this opportu-
nity to rule that large lot zoning was invalid unless there was some
extraordinary justification. The court ruled that large lot sizes were
not required to promote the general welfare, and were inconsistent
with that purpose.6"
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expanded the reasoning of
National Land and Concord Township to a new area of exclusion-
ary zoning in Appeal of Girsh. ° In Girsh the developer sought to
build two high-rise apartment houses, but the township's zoning
ordinance did not provide for apartments. The township argued
that apartments were not excluded by the ordinance, contending
that there existed procedures which, after a showing of special cir-
cumstances, would permit apartment construction. 71 The township
also argued that if the ordinance did exclude apartments, this was
64. See Wright, Constitutional Rights and Land Use Planning: The New and the Old
Reality, 1977 DUKE L. J. 841, 850-51.
65. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
66. Id. at 525, 215 A.2d at 609.
67. Id. at 528, 215 A.2d at 610.
68. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
69. Id. at 471, 268 A.2d 767. The court was concerned that the community could effec-
tively "freeze" the population at its present level, thereby forcing those people that would
desire to live in Concord Township to live in another community. Id. at 474-75, 268 A.2d at
768-69.
70. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
71. Id. at 240-41, 263 A.2d at 396-97. See Comment, The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court and Exclusionary Suburban Zoning: From Bilbar to Girsh - A Decade of Change,
16 VELL. L. REV. 507 (1971).
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a legitimate exercise of the local planning function. 2
The Girsh court dismissed the township's first argument and
concentrated on the exclusion of apartments. The court held that
the township was zoning out future development and those people
who would desire to live in the community.7 The court determined
that a township cannot limit its population to as many people as
can live in single-family housing, for if every township set up simi-
lar ordinances, population growth would be frustrated. 4
After the supreme court decided Girsh, the commonwealth court
dealt with a series of exclusionary zoning cases." In these cases the
court shifted the presumption that the municipality's ordinance
was valid to requiring the municipality to prove that the exclusions
served an important public interest. The commonwealth court in-
validated these ordinances after examining the communities' de-
velopment and determining whether the communities were ac-
cepting their fair share of population growth. 6
In 1975 the supreme court again dealt with an ordinance which,
in effect, excluded multi-family housing. In Surrick v. Zoning
Hearing Bd. of the Township of Upper Providence7 7 the court de-
veloped a workable analysis to be used in evaluating alleged exclu-
sionary zoning ordinances.7 8 The Surrick court stated that the
courts should confine their analyses to a determination of whether
or not a particular zoning ordinance balances the many factors
which bear upon housing needs. 9
The Surrick court set forth the factors which must be examined
in an analytical method of review. The starting point involves a
determination of whether the community is in the path of develop-
ment and population growth. This is determined by considering
projected population growth figures and the community's proxim-
ity to large cities.80 If the community is in the path of develop-
ment, then the percentage of land that is available for multi-family
72. 437 Pa. at 243-45, 263 A.2d at 398-99.
73. Id. at 242, 263 A.2d at 397.
74. Id. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398.
75. See, e.g., Berger v. Board of Supervisors, 31 Pa. Commw. 386, 376 A.2d 296 (1977);
Appeal of Olson, 19 Pa. Commw. 514, 338 A.2d 748 (1975); Camp Hill Development Co. v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 13 Pa. Commw. 519, 319 A.2d 197 (1974).
76. See ALLENSWORTH, supra note 61, at 155.
77. 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977).
78. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. The court was concerned that by
applying the "fair share" test the court would become a super zoning board. 476 Pa. at 191,
382 A.2d at 109.
79. 476 Pa. at 191, 382 A.2d at 109-10.
80. Id. at 191-92, 382 A.2d at 110.
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dwellings is the next factor to be considered." The final considera-
tion is whether the ordinance has the effect of frustrating the natu-
ral growth of population.8 2 The court would probably not find an
ordinance to be exclusionary if the township was already highly
developed.83 While a total ban on multi-family dwellings was disal-
lowed in Girsh, the court in Surrick stated that by examining the
ordinance in light of the analysis developed, a partial exclusion
could be evaluated to determine if the ordinance is exclusionary.84
These cases illustrate how Pennsylvania courts have previously
dealt with exclusionary zoning challenges. Generally, the courts
have taken the position that a community must be willing to ac-
cept its "fair share" of all categories of people who desire to live
there.8 5 Kravitz, however, has severely lessened the effectiveness of
these cases. As Justice Hutchinson pointed out in his dissent,
townhouses provide people of moderate means with the opportu-
nity to own their own residences.8 6 The Kravitz court is, in effect,
forcing people who cannot afford a detached residence in Wrights-
town to either rent or live in another community.8 7 By allowing the
township to exclude low and moderate income people, the court is
refusing to extend the "fair share" principle of Surrick to protect
the legitimate needs of such people." This principle requires com-
munities to protect the legitimate needs of all categories of people
who want to reside in the community."
This is a regrettable development in Pennsylvania zoning law.
While other states are recognizing the burdens that exclusionary
zoning ordinances place on low and moderate income people,90 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has chosen to evaluate ordinances
simply by balancing general projected population growth figures
against projected housing construction. The court has avoided con-
sideration of zoning boards' findings or motives, claiming that it
81. Id.
82. Id. at 192-93, 382 A.2d at 110.
83. Id. at 193, 382 A.2d at 111.
84. Id. at 194, 382 A.2d at 111.
85. See Surrick, 476 Pa. at 191 & n.8, 382 A.2d at 109 & n.8 (1977).
86. 501 Pa. at 216-17, 460 A.2d at 1084 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 222, 460 A.2d at 1087 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). See also 476 Pa. 182 at
189, 382 A.2d 105 at 108.
89. 476 Pa. at 189, 382 A.2d at 108.
90. See Burns, Class Struggle in the Suburbs: Exclusionary Zoning Against the Poor,
2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 179 (1975) and Lowery, Exclusionary Zoning: Mount Laurel -
Seminal or Tempest-In-A-Teapot, 4 WEST. NEw ENG. L. REv. 541, 546-47 & n.53 (1982).
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does not want to become a "super board of adjustment".9 1 The
Kravitz court did not attempt to determine if the housing sought
to be built in Wrightstown would provide a segment of the popula-
tion with a needed type of residence. The court only attempted to
determine whether any population growth was provided for, and
not if any particular use was permitted.9e
The courts of other states, however, have been more concerned
with the housing needs of their residents who have been excluded
by restrictive ordinances. One of the most significant and compre-
hensive decisions invalidating exclusionary zoning is the New
Jersey Supreme Court's ruling in Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mt. Laurel 11)." 8 This case
was a reaffirmation of a 1975 case of the same name,9 4 which re-
quired communities to accommodate their fair share of low and
moderate income housing. In Mt. Laurel II the court ruled that
zoning ordinances must take into account not only the welfare of
the residents of the community, but also the welfare of those peo-
ple who live in the surrounding region which contributes to the
housing demand of the community. 5 If the zoning ordinances do
not provide ample area for the region's low and moderate income
housing, Mt. Laurel H proclaims that such ordinances will be con-
sidered an abuse of the police power and therefore unconstitu-
tional. 6 The court based its ruling on the grounds that the state is
in control of the land and, in exercising that control, cannot pro-
vide housing opportunities for the rich by burdening the poor
through land use restrictions.9 7 Mt. Laurel H also requires commu-
nities not only to eliminate unnecessary restrictions on moderate
and low income housing, but in addition to seek government hous-
ing subsidies, developer incentives and set-aside projects.98
While New York courts have not gone as far as their counter-
parts in New Jersey in their zoning decisions, the Court of Appeals
91. See 476 Pa. at 191-93, 382 A.2d at 109-10.
92. 501 Pa. at 210, 460 A.2d at 1081.
93. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983). The implications of this decision are discussed in
35 LAND USE LAW AND ZONING DIGEST 3 (1983).
94. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). For a discussion
of the development of the law leading up to the Mt. Laurel decision, see Wright, supra note
64.
95. 92 N.J. at 208, 456 A.2d at 415.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 209, 456 A.2d at 415.
98. Id. at 217, 456 A.2d at 419. A set-aside project is a requirement that a certain
percentage of land in a particular zone be reserved for low and moderate income housing.
Id. at 267-68, 456 A.2d at 446.
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of New York has held that communities will be required to plan
for the needs of its residents and the housing needs of the people
in the surrounding region. In Berenson v. Town of New Castle,9"
the court pointed out that while there may be a local desire to
maintain the status quo, this desire must be balanced against the
requirements of the people in that region who need adequate hous-
ing. 00 The approach in Berenson is thus similar to that taken by
the Pennsylvania courts before Kravitz.
The pre-Kravitz approach is illustrated by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in Surrick, which ruled that communities must de-
sign zoning ordinances which meet the legitimate needs of the peo-
ple who might want to reside in that community.' 0' The court has
not recognized, however, that the construction of townhouses
meets a legitimate need of low and moderate income people who
desire to purchase their own residences. This view of townhouses
was reaffirmed by the supreme court in Appeal of Elocin,'0° a case
decided contemporaneously with Kravitz. The facts of this case
were similar to Kravitz and the court applied the same rationale. 08
It would seem that unless there is a change in the membership of
the court, townhouses will not be recognized as a valid distinct use
which should be protected.'0"
The Mt. Laurel H decision, however, suggests another way to
attack exclusionary ordinances. Instead of looking to see whether a
community has a given number of multi-family dwellings, an ordi-
nance could be challenged on the grounds that it unreasonably
burdens low and moderate income people and does not protect the
general welfare.' 05 A challenge phrased in this manner would re-
quire the court to examine the actual types of housing provided
and the types of housing needed, instead of focusing exclusively on
population and housing statistics. This is not an altogether ex-
treme proposal - in exclusionary zoning cases, after all, the su-
99. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236 (1975). See Anderson and Mayo, Land Use Con-
trol, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 371 (1980).
100. 38 N.Y.2d at 110-11, 341 N.E.2d at 242.
101. 476 Pa. at 189, 382 A.2d at 108.
102. 501 Pa. 348, 461 A.2d 771 (1983).
103. Id. at 353, 461 A.2d at 773.
104. The commonwealth court dealt with another exclusionary zoning ordinance after
the Kravitz decision. In this case the court ruled that a township's ordinance, even though it
totally prohibited all multi-family housing, was valid because the municipality was not a
logical area for growth and development. The court noted that their previous decisions, at
least in terms of townhouses and restrictive zoning, have been weakened. See Fernley v.
Board of Supervisors, - Pa. Commw. -, 464 A.2d 587 (1983).
105. See Burns, supra note 90, at 193-201.
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preme court does review some of the factors which contribute to
zoning boards' decisions. Still, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would probably reject taking on this added responsibility by claim-
ing that it would thrust them into the position of becoming a super
zoning board.106 By reviewing only some of the factors which bear
on boards' decisions, however, the court will continue to do the job
of a very inefficient zoning board.
In addition, while the Kravitz court was correct in pointing out
that it is local zoning boards that have the necessary expertise to
examine all the relevant factors involved before making zoning de-
cisions, 107 it must also be recognized that many zoning boards have
no incentive to provide for low and moderate income housing. In
fact, since zoning boards are generally comprised of members of
the community, their tendency will be to maintain the status
quo.
08
As the court in Mt. Laurel II recognized, legislative action in the
area of land use planning may be the most desirable solution.10 9
Requiring communities to zone areas for low and moderate income
uses such as townhouses, however, can be very unpopular politi-
cally. It is up to the courts to protect the constitutional interests of
those people who are not adequately represented."10 As the New
Jersey Supreme Court pointed out in Mt. Laurel II, "[w]e may not
build houses but we do enforce the constitution."''
Francis X. McTiernan, Jr.
106. See Kravitz, 501 Pa. at 215, 460 A.2d at 1083.
107. Id.
108. A developer of low and moderate income housing is likely to face a variety of
obstacles from the community. These include site plan and subdivision reviews and environ-
mental ordinances without specific standards, or with standards that are unattainable. See
Mallach, Do Lawsuits Build Housing?: The Implications of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation,
6 Rurr.-CAM. 653, 662 (1975) and Developments in the Law - Zoning, supra note 63, at
1629-31 & n.26 (1978).
109. 92 N.J. at 352, 456 A.2d at 490. In Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 476,
268 A.2d 765, 769 (1970), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the value of zoning
on a regional basis as the court in Mt. Laurel II mandated. The court ruled, however, that it
must deal with the system as it is and ensure that local governments do not abuse their
power.
110. See Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in Cases of Exclusionary Zon-
ing, 74 MICH. L. REv. 760 (1976).
111. 92 N.J. at 352, 456 A.2d at 490.
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